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Abstract 
This paper presents an experimental study that compares the ability of human 
groups to escape the tragedy of the commons through institutional change or com-
munication. Teams of five players are placed in a dynamic CPR environment with 
inefficient institutional settings. The results clearly show the vital importance of com-
munication. At the same time, the groups who were allowed to replace the inefficient 
institutional settings by other more appropriate rules performed worse than those 
groups who were not given this opportunity.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Hardin (1968)’s tragedy of the commons, social dilemmas have been on 
the research agenda of social science. Human societies face social dilemma situa-
tions in many fields of their economic life. At the same time, they have proven to be 
very creative in finding ways to resolve these dilemma situations (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 
Heltberg 2002). Following Messick and Brewer (1983), they apply two general cate-
gories of solutions. First, the individuals can communicate and convince each other 
to cooperate while leaving the formal institutions for their interaction unchanged. Al-
ternatively, they can change precisely these institutions in order to alter the individual 
incentives in a way that makes cooperative behavior individually rational. The appli-
cability and effectiveness of these two options has been analysed in a large number 
of laboratory experiments. Depending on the options the players have in the experi-
ment, two types of experiments can be identified. The vast majority of experiments 
belongs to the first type, permitting the individual player to choose between different 
actions within a given set of rules. The primary objective of these single-choice ex-
periments is to find out to what extent individuals cooperate in social dilemma situa-
tions and what factors determine the degree of cooperation. Communication is found 
to increase the level of cooperation substantially (e.g., Isaac et al. 1984, Isaac et al. 
1994, Ostrom et al. 1992). In the second group of experiments (hereafter double-
choice experiments), individual players can choose between different actions. Addi-
tionally, the group of players as a whole can change the institutional restrictions on 
the individual choice of action (e.g., Samuelson and Messick 1986, Carpenter 2000). 
Though the number of double-choice experiments is still small, their results indicate 
that the participants are able to escape the tragedy of the commons by changing the 
institutional framework if they are given this opportunity. With respect to their set-up, 
the existing double-choice experiments differ substantially from the single-choice ex-
periments found in the literature. Therefore it is impossible to compare the relative 
effectiveness of communication and institutional change as a means to resolve social 
dilemma situations. The current paper presents a first series of experiments that is 
designed to facilitate this comparison. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
gives a short overview on previous experiments on human behaviour in social di-
lemma situations. Section 3 outlines the set-up of the experimental study presented 
in this paper, while section 4 lays out the predictive theory. The results of the experi-
ments are presented in section 5 and discussed in section 6. 
2. Previous experiments on human behavior in social dilemma situations 
Social dilemma situations appear when a number of individuals have free access 
to a scarce common pool resource (CPR) or when they have to provide a public good 
on basis of voluntary contributions (e.g., Olson 1965, Ostrom 1990). The number of 
single-choice experiments on human behavior in social dilemma situations is large. 
They differ in some major characteristics of their set-up, such as group size, form and 
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level of payoffs or the extent to which players are allowed to communicate. Most of 
them are so-called public good games, in which a group of individuals are given the 
task to provide a public good on the basis of voluntary contributions (e.g., Marwell 
and Ames 1979, Isaac et al. 1984, Isaac et al.1994, Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997). In 
addition, some CPR-experiments are reported. These assemble a number of players 
around a CPR, which they have to cultivate (e.g., Gardner et al. 1987, Ostrom et al. 
1992, Walker et al. 2000). Regardless of their actual set-up, all single-choice experi-
ments report an average degree of cooperation that is below the group-efficient de-
gree but substantially above the one predicted by economic theory (e.g., Isaac et al. 
1984, Ostrom et al. 1992, Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997, Walker et al. 2000). Face-to-
face communication increases the degree of communication (e.g., Ostrom et al. 
1992, Weimann 1994) because it allows the players to signal their willingness to co-
operate (e.g., Brosig 2002) and use moral suasion and threats to induce cooperative 
behaviour among their co-players (Fehr and Gächter 2000).
1
  
The author found only three double-choice experiments that were performed by 
Samuelson et al., (1984) respectively Samuelson and Messick (1986), Sato (1987) 
and Carpenter (2000). These experiments place a group of players in a CPR envi-
ronment and let them play a number of rounds under a fixed set of rules. Thereby the 
players are given the chance to learn about the basic mechanisms of the game and 
try to resolve the social dilemma without restricting the access to the CPR. The play-
ers do not know who their co-players are and are not allowed to communicate before 
or during the experiment.
2
 Consequently, they cannot signal a possible predisposition 
to cooperate, nor can they apply moral suasion or threats to induce cooperative be-
havior. As a result, the overall payoffs are far from efficient. In the second part of the 
experiment, some groups are given the opportunity, to change the rules of the game 
and play a number of further rounds. The institutions are enforced at zero costs. 
These groups made use of the new opportunity and as a result their payoffs increase 
considerably to reach a near efficient level. The control groups who played the sec-
ond part of the experiment under the initial inefficient set of institutions continued to 
perform poorly.  
In sum, the single- and double-choice experiments show that communication re-
spectively institutional change helps groups to resolve social dilemma situations to an 
extent that they cannot reach without these possibilities. However, the existing sin-
gle-choice experiments do not permit institutional change while the double-choice 
experiments performed so far do not allow communication. At the same time, the two 
                                                 
1
  The chance to impose sanctions on defecting players has similar effects (e.g., Chen and Plott 1996, Fehr 
and Gächter 2000) 
2
  In the experiments by Samuelson et al. (1984), the subjects are told that they are part of a group of six 
individuals. In reality, however, they do not play in groups; every individual participates in an isolated ex-
periment in which the other members of the groups are simulated. In every round, the human player re-
ceives false feedback on the behavior of his co-players. 
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types of experiments are fundamentally different in their set-up. Therefore, it is diffi-
cult to compare communication and institutional with respect to their relative effi-
ciency as a means to overcome social dilemma situations. The following section pre-
sents an experimental set-up which is especially designed to facilitate this compari-
son.  
3. Experimental set-up 
3.1 Rules 
As in the experiment by Sato (1987), the experimental set-up is explained by us-
ing a real-life background that may cause framing effects that, in turn, lead to a 
higher degree of cooperation as compared to a game without real-life background 
(e.g., Zelmer 2003). As all groups are presented the same real-life background, it 
cannot explain differences in the performance of experimental and control group, on 
which this paper focuses. The main purpose of introducing a real-life background is 
to allow those groups who are allowed to communicate to exploit fully the advantage 
of communication. It allows the group to refer to real-life categories rather than ab-
stract entities in their discussions. The following real-life background is presented: 
Five families live off the fish they catch in a nearby lake and sell at the local market. 
For all families, fishing is the only source of income. Every family consists of three 
generations. Only the second generation engages in fishing and makes all the nec-
essary decisions. After a certain time, this formerly active generation retires and 
hands over the right to fish to the next generation. Provided that the lake is not de-
pleted, the young generation will grant the retired generation a pension. Since the 
fish does not exist in abundance and reproduces only at a limited rate, a permanent 
flow of fish can only be guaranteed if each family catches less fish per period than it 
theoretically could. The families can organize the necessary fishing restriction by set-
ting a quota of fish every family is allowed to catch. In order to enforce this quota, 
they can hire an independent patrolling service. The higher the patrolling intensity, 
the higher the patrolling costs each family has to incur.  
The experiment is played by five players, each representing the active generation 
of one family. The aim of every player is to maximize his total income during the ex-
periment. It consists of the money he can earn when selling his fish on the market 
(1 $ per fish) minus the patrolling costs plus the pension. The fishing will take seven 
rounds in total. Every player can catch as much as 2 000 fish per round. Initially, the 
lake contains 10 000 fish. At the beginning of every round, the teams have the possi-
bility to install a quota that settles the number of fish that each player is allowed to 
fish in the current round. If three players agree on this quota, it is passed and viola-
tions will be punished, provided that the defecting players are caught. Before the fish-
ing starts, the players can change the patrolling rule that sets the probability P of 
catching a player who tries to defect. Six different levels of patrolling can be chosen 
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(see Table 1). The rule is changed if three players vote in favor of the new rule; oth-
erwise the old rule remains active. Initially, the rule is set to rule 2.  
Next, each player decides independently on the number of fish he intends to 
catch. His fishing plans can be in accordance with the quota or deviate from it. Once 
all players have made their decision they declare their fishing plans to the organizer 
of the game. The players do not know each others’ fishing plans. If a player defects, 
his fishing success depends on whether he is caught or not. For each attempt to de-
fect, a random number processor is used to determine whether it is successful or not. 
If a player gets caught, he will receive no fish and his attempt to defect will be pub-
licly announced. Otherwise his fishing plans are not reduced and his defection is not 
made public.  
Table 1: Patrolling rules, costs and probability of catching a defecting player 
Patrolling rule Patrolling costs (C) per player and round Probability P 
(patrolling intensity) 
1 0 0.00 
2 50 0.25 
3 150 0.50 
4 250 0.67 
5 450 0.85 
6 700 0.95 
 
The total demand for fish consists of the sum of fishing plans of the cooperative 
players plus the fishing plans of those defecting players who were successful in their 
attempts to defect. If the total demand for fish is smaller or equal to the contents of 
the lake, every player (except for those who are caught defecting) will get the de-
manded number of fish. If the total demand exceeds the number of fish in the lake, all 
fish will be distributed among these players proportionally to their demand. The final 
amount of fish left in the lake is announced. If the lake contains less than 500 fish, 
there will be no further fishing and thus the experiment ends here. Otherwise, the 
remaining number of fish is doubled to give the starting point of the next round. How-
ever, the number of fish cannot exceed 10 000. The fishing ends at the latest after 
seven rounds.  
In the eighth round, the players retire and are granted a pension. Every player will 
receive a single payment amounting to one quarter of the remaining number of fish in 
the beginning of round 8, at most $ 2 000. In round 8, the players do not have to in-
cur any patrolling costs. The experiment ends here. The organizer informs every 
player separately about his total income during the experiment. For every $ 1 000, a 
player is paid 1 Euro in cash.
3
 
                                                 
3
  This “exchange rate” ensures that the average payoff amounts to the average wage a student 
can expect when spending the same amount of time on a students’ job. In addition, a player 
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3.2 Participants 
Six teams of players (MAJC-teams) played the experiments precisely according 
to the rules laid out in section 3.1 without any restrictions on communication. Another 
six teams (MAJnoC-teams) followed the same rules but were not allowed to commu-
nicate verbally or non-verbally throughout the experiment. The remaining 20 teams 
were neither allowed to nor informed about the possibility to change the patrolling 
intensity. Eight teams (FIX25C teams) played under the fixed rule 2 (P = 25 percent; 
C = $ 50) and were allowed to communicate freely.
4
 Six FIX25noC teams faced the 
fixed rule 2 but were not allowed to communicate. Figure 1 gives a systematic over-
view of these for major groups. Hereafter, the teams in row 1 are called MAJ teams 
while those in row 2 are called FIX25 teams. An additional set of six experiments was 
performed where patrolling intensity was set to P = 10 percent at costs of C = $ 10 
per round (FIX10) while communication was permitted.  
Figure 1: Major groups by set-up 
Institutional change  
 
 
Communication 
permitted prohibited 
permitted MAJC FIX25C 
prohibited MAJnoC FIX25noC 
 
The experiments were performed at the University of Giessen, Germany, be-
tween October 2000 and November 2004 and involved 56 female and 104 male stu-
dents majoring in economics who participated on a voluntary basis.  
4. Predictive theories 
This section will develop predictions concerning the behavior of the groups of 
students in the experiment described above. Section 4.1 applies game-theoretic rea-
                                                                                                                                                        
who defects doubles his monetary reward earned in the corresponding round from one to two 
Euro. Thereby both average and marginal incentives are high enough to comply with the sug-
gestions by Davis and Holt (1993, 24-26).  
4
  The surprisingly high degree of cooperation observed in the first six FIX25C experiments led the 
author to perform two extra experiments.  
Ivo Bischoff  Institutional choice vs communication in social dilemmas 
   
Arbeitspapier  9 
soning to predict the individual as well as group behavior in the different set-ups. In 
section 4.2, these predictions are then discussed and modified or complemented by 
taking into account evidence from earlier experimental studies.  
4.1 Game theoretic predictions 
4.1.1 Quota-setting behavior 
The efficient fishing strategy for the group as a whole is to extract 5 000 fish in 
the first six rounds and 6 000 fish in the seventh round. This leaves 8 000 fish in the 
lake at the beginning of round 8 and therefore ensures the maximum pension of 
$ 2 000 for each player. The maximum total group earning is thus $ 46 000, which 
equals $ 9 200 per player. Every deviation from the described strategy will reduce the 
total group return. If undiscovered defection leads to over-fishing, the CPR can only 
recover if the quota is reduced in the next round. The optimal quota Q*, that is the 
quota that maximizes the total possible yield, is given by the following expression: 
 Qt* = max {0; 0.2(Ft - Rt)}  (1) 
 where   Ft = number of fish in the lake in the beginning of round t 
Rt = 5 000 for t = 1 .... 6; Rt = 4 000 for t = 7. 
Assuming rational players, the teams can be expected to follow this method of quota-
setting.  
4.1.2 Rule-setting behavior, defection and group payoff 
After the quota has been set, each player has to decide whether to comply with it 
or to try to extract more fish. The probability for a defecting player to be caught does 
not depend on the number of fish he wants to catch in addition to the quota. Hence: 
Prediction 1: Defecting players will try to extract the maximum possible number of 
2 000 fish. 
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Table 2: Simulated payoffs for different patrolling rules and levels of defection 
Individual payoff of player 1 for … defecting co-players 
(payoff calculated using a discount rate of 0.1 per round) 
Patrolling rule / 
player 1’s strat-
egy 0 1 2 3 4 
1 / cooperate 
9 200 
(6 386) 
5 731 
(4 527) 
2 240 
(2 094) 
1 571 
(1 514) 
1 222 
(1 200) 
1 / defect 
15 268 
(11 108) 
5 400 
(4 934) 
3 333 
(3 200) 
2 500 
(2 450) 
2 000 
(2 000) 
2 / cooperate 
8 850 
(6 125) 
6 698 
(4 780) 
3 352 
(2 820) 
2 140 
(1 952) 
1 789 
(1 673) 
2 / defect 
11 682 
(8 383) 
7 071 
(5 684) 
4 029 
(3 596) 
3 104 
(2 869) 
2 514 
(2 384) 
3 / cooperate 
8 150 
(5 604) 
6 245 
(4 326) 
5 475 
(3 964) 
3 813 
(2 928) 
3 574 
(2 833) 
3 / defect 
7 662 
(5 341) 
6 856 
(4 894) 
5 175 
(3 909) 
4 302 
(3 358) 
3 522 
(2 861) 
4 / cooperate 
7 450 
(5 082) 
5 917 
(4 037) 
6 376 
(4 396) 
5 487 
(3 820) 
5 779 
(4 065) 
4 / defect 
4 750 
(3 147) 
4 691 
(3 115) 
4 384 
(2 941) 
4 169 
(2 816) 
3 966 
(2 714) 
5 / cooperate 
6 050 
(4 039) 
5 196 
(3 451) 
5 867 
(3 917) 
5 653 
(3 768) 
5 936 
(3 963) 
5 / defect 
858 
(227) 
922 
(268) 
892 
(242) 
936 
(277) 
976 
(299) 
6 / cooperate 
4 300 
(2 734) 
3 985 
(2 517) 
4 279 
(2 720) 
4 255 
(2 704) 
4 297 
(2 732) 
6 / defect 
-2 230 
(-2 088) 
-2 190 
(-2 062) 
-2 205 
(-2 069) 
-2 208 
(-2 074) 
-2 197 
(-2 065) 
 
Under the initial rule, the probability of getting caught when defecting is 0.25. 
Thus any player can increase his expected short-term payoff by defecting. Due to the 
stochastic nature of the game, the expected long-term payoff from defection cannot 
be calculated exactly. Table 2 contains estimates for the payoffs from cooperation 
and defection that an individual player can expect for different patrolling intensities 
and co-players’ behavior. These estimates represent the average payoffs of 10 000 
simulated experiments per constellation. Teams are assumed to set their quota effi-
ciently. Two different estimates are presented. While the first figure represents the 
sum of all payoffs throughout the experiment, the payoffs in parenthesis are dis-
counted using the rate of 0.1 per round. Discounting accounts for the fact that, given 
the danger of resource extinction, the payoffs become increasingly uncertain the later 
in the experiment they are expected to occur. The discount factor thus represents the 
rate of time preference due to uncertainty. The simulated payoffs in Table 2 show 
that for rule 2, defection represents the strictly dominant strategy. Hence rational 
players can be expected to defect under the initially installed patrolling intensity. At 
the same time, the simulation results clearly show that collective defection reduces 
the expected payoff by 71.6 percent from $ 8 850 to $ 2 513 per capita. This patrol-
ling intensity is insufficient to ensure efficient payoffs and preserve the CPR. This is 
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true all the more for the patrolling intensity of P = 0.1 set for the FIX10C teams. In 
their case, the surveillance can merely be called symbolic.  
MAJ teams can destroy the incentives to defect by increasing the patrolling inten-
sity. Rule of thumb calculations indicate that, under rule 3 (P = 0.5), a risk-neutral 
player cannot expect any short-term gains from defection as the expected payoff is 
equal to the certain payoff in the case of cooperation. Among risk-averse players, 
rule 3 is sufficient to induce cooperative behaviour, yet the structure of payoffs in ta-
ble 2 indicates that any cooperative equilibrium under rule 3 remains fragile. Espe-
cially when assuming a positive rate of time preference, any rational player is better 
off if he defects as soon as he expects one or more of his co-players to defect. 
Merely the patrolling intensity of rules 4 to 6 is sufficient to destroy all short- and long-
term incentives to defect. Among these three rules, rule 4 induces a stable coopera-
tive equilibrium at the lowest patrolling costs. The corresponding payoff of $ 7 450 
per player represents a benchmark for MAJ teams.  
Prediction 2: At minimum, MAJ teams will achieve a net return of $ 7 450 per player, 
which equals a group payoff of $ 37 250. 
For those teams who are allowed to communicate, threats are an alternative in-
strument to induce cooperation. First, they can threaten to set an inefficiently high 
quota for the rounds following defection. However, any higher quota will surely further 
reduce the expected income of both defecting and cooperative players. Therefore the 
corresponding threat lacks credibility. Second, the other players can threaten to react 
by changing from cooperative behavior to defection. The CPR will be depleted very 
quickly, destroying the prospect of future fishing income as well as the pension. As 
long as the cooperative players see a chance for the CPR to recover, a change from 
cooperation to defection is irrational. The corresponding threat is thus not credible 
either. Consequently, FIX teams do not have any effective instruments to destroy the 
incentives to defect. Hence, 
Prediction 3: FIX teams will witness a higher frequency of defection than MAJ 
teams. 
Prediction 4: FIX teams will not be able to preserve the CPR from extinction.  
Other than FIX25C and FIX10C teams, MAJC teams can apply an additional third 
type of threat to induce cooperative behavior. They may threaten to vote for a higher 
patrolling intensity if one or more player defect. As the costs of this reaction are mo-
derate and the benefits are substantial, players can credibly threaten to install a high 
patrolling rule once defectious behavior occurs. However, backward induction shows 
that this threat is not sufficient to destroy the incentives to defect.
5
 Thus patrolling has 
to be installed in round 1.  
                                                 
5
  See Appendix for a detailed description of the underlying course of argumentation.  
Ivo Bischoff  Institutional choice vs communication in social dilemmas 
   
Arbeitspapier  12 
Prediction 5: MAJ teams will introduce patrolling rule 3 or higher in round 1. 
4.2 Evidence from earlier experiments 
Game-theoretic reasoning systematically underestimates the level of voluntary 
cooperation in social dilemma games. This is especially true in those cases where 
players are allowed to communicate (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1992, Weimann 1994). This 
leads to prediction 6. 
Prediction 6: FIX25C teams will have higher payoffs than FIX25noC teams.  
For the relative performance of MAJC and MAJnoC teams, the conclusions are less 
straight forward. Given the right to communicate, MAJC teams have to rely less 
heavily on patrolling to ensure cooperation. Thus, 
Prediction 7: MAJnoC will set a higher patrolling intensity than MAJC teams.  
The resulting difference in patrolling costs may result in a minor difference in payoffs 
but are not large enough to expect such differences to be significant.  
Previous single choice experiments have shown a termination effect, that is a 
substantial though not full deterioration of cooperative behavior in the last round 
(e.g., Weimann 1994, Ledyard 1995). This leads to prediction 8: 
Prediction 8: FIX teams will witness an increase in defection in the last round.  
Consequently, the CPR is in danger of extinction, giving support to prediction 4. 
Finally, all experimental studies report a very wide dispersion of group behavior. 
In single choice experiments, some groups are found to cooperate in the vast major-
ity of cases, while others show extensive defection (e.g., Isaac et al. 1984, Isaac et 
al. 1994, Gardner et al. 1997). As these teams are placed in an identical environment 
with identical incentives, the different degrees of cooperation observed must be 
caused by differences in group characteristics such as the players’ attitude towards 
risk or their preference for fairness (e.g., Boone et al. 1999). While some teams are 
able to reach a cooperative solution under the given set of rules, the same rules 
prove inappropriate for other teams. In single-choice experiments, all teams are 
forced to play under the same set of rules. Those teams who find these inappropriate 
to reach a cooperative solution will perform poorly because they do not have a suit-
able instrument at hand to resolve the social dilemma. MAJ teams are given a suit-
able instrument as they are allowed to change the rules if this proves necessary. As 
a result, their average economic performance can be expected to be higher than that 
of FIX-teams who do not have the opportunity to change the institutions (e.g., Sato 
1987, Carpenter 2000). These considerations lead to final prediction 9
6
: 
                                                 
6
  This prediction is also backed by theoretical considerations following an evolutionary approach (e.g., Sethi and 
Samanathan 1996).  
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Prediction 9: MAJ teams will reach systematically higher average payoffs than FIX 
teams. 
5. Results 
5.1 Quota-setting behavior 
In those experiments where communication was allowed, all teams passed quo-
tas in all rounds. In 89.8 percent, the quota was passed unanimously. All teams set 
the efficient quota of 1 000 fish per capita in round 1, thereby clearly indicating that 
they identified the group-efficient fishing strategy. As indicated in table 3, the quota 
setting-behavior in the following rounds equalled the one proposed in section 4.1 in 
the vast majority of cases. In total, 86.6 percent of all quotas were set efficiently, indi-
cating that the teams were able to identify the group-efficient fishing strategy. Those 
teams that were not allowed to communicate were substantially less efficient and uni-
fied when setting the quota. In 16.9 percent of the rounds, they did not manage to 
agree on a binding quota, and only once was a quota passed unanimously. Only 
58.4 percent of the quotas set in round 1 were efficient. In the following rounds, this 
share dropped to less than 40 percent.  
Table 3: Quota-setting behavior 
Share of quotas set efficiently in round __ 
[percent] 
Set-up Share of rounds 
with binding 
quota [percent] 
Share of unani-
mous quotas  
[percent] 
1 2 – 6 7 
MAJC 100 80 100 71 80 
MAJnoC 88.6 2.9 66.7 10.3 25 
FIX25C 100 92.9 100 95 75 
FIX25noC 78.6 0 50 16.7 33.3 
FIX10 100 95.1 100 96.7 40 
 
5.2 Rule-setting behavior and defection 
After setting a quota, MAJ teams have to decide about the patrolling intensity. In 
the beginning of the game, three of these teams abolished patrolling completely, six 
left the rule unchanged and only three teams introduced rule 3 (see Table 4).  
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Table 4: Patrolling rule and intensity in MAJ groups 
Patrolling rule in round Group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Average  
patrolling  
intensity* 
MAJC_1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00 
MAJC_2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.50 
MAJC_3 2 3 3 2 2   0.35 
MAJC_4 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 0.32 
MAJC_5 1 2 3 3 2 3 2 0.32 
MAJC_6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00 
Average patrolling 
intensity  0.17 0.29 0.33 0.21 0.17 0.30 0.25 0.25 
         
MAJnoC_1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 0.25 
MAJnoC_2 3 3 3 2 4   0.54 
MAJnoC_3 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 0.42 
MAJnoC_4 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 0.42 
MAJnoC_5 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 0.33 
MAJnoC_6 2 3 2 1    0.25 
Average patrolling 
intensity*  0.29 0.29 0.38 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.37 
* Calculated only from those rounds in which a binding quota was passed. 
 
Prediction 5, according to which MAJ teams will set rule 3 or stricter in round 1, is 
clearly rejected (binomial test for a probability of setting rule 3 or higher of 0.95, 
   = 0.05). All 12 MAJ teams made use of this right at least once during the experi-
ment. Three teams changed the patrolling rules in the first round and stuck to the 
newly introduced rule throughout the entire experiment. Two of these teams chose 
rule 1; one team chose rule 3. The other teams changed the rule more frequently, at 
most 5 times. The strictest patrolling rule implemented was rule 4. The average pa-
trolling intensity throughout the entire game – measured by the probability of discov-
ering defection – was 0.25 for MAJC and 0.37 for MAJnoC teams.
7
 The difference in 
patrolling intensity is not significant (t-test, 
 
 = 0.1) in a simple comparison but 
proves significant when controlling for pre-game contact (see section 5.4) in a two-
way ANOVA (Student-Newman-Keuls-Test,    = 0.05), thus giving support to predic-
tion 7. In both set-ups the lowest average rule per round was observed in round 1. 
Tracing the rule-changing behavior beyond the first round reveals no systematic pat-
tern for MAJC teams (rSP = 0.07, conservative testing,    = 0.05) or MAJnoC teams 
(rSP = 0.357, conservative testing,    = 0.05).  
The average number of defections per round differs between the teams with a 
minimum value of 0.64 for FIX25C teams and a maximum of 1.52 for FIX25noC 
                                                 
7
  This average is calculated for those rounds where a binding quota was passed.  
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teams (see Table 5). Pairwise comparisons of the average number of defections 
across set-ups reveal a significant difference between FIX25C and FIX25noC teams 
(t-test,    = 0.05), thus giving support to prediction 6. In order to account for the per-
mission to change rules and communication at the same time, a two-way ANOVA is 
performed but reveals no significant effect of either of these two factors on the aver-
age number of defections. Thus prediction 3, according to which the FIX25 teams are 
expected to witness a higher defection rate than MAJ teams, is rejected. When trac-
ing defection across rounds, no termination effect was observed in FIX teams. Pre-
diction 8 is rejected (Fisher-Yates test,    = 0.05). In 44.8 percent of all attempts to 
defect (57.6 percent in the MAJC, 25.8 percent in the MAJnoC, 33.3 percent in the 
FIX25C, 18.2 percent in the FIX25noC and 40.6 percent in the FIX10C set-up), play-
ers planned to extract less than the maximum possible amount of 2 000 fish. Predic-
tion 1 is clearly rejected (binomial test for a probability of choosing 2000 fish of 0.95, 
  = 0.05).  
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Table 5: Group characteristics and group performance  
 
 
group 
average 
patrolling 
intensity*
net group 
payoff 
defec-
tions per 
round 
changes 
in rule 
distinction 
after 
round 
group 
pension
average  
number 
of se-
mester 
average 
number 
of visits
female 
players
MAJC_1 0 44 800 0.14 1  8 000 7 3.4 0 
MAJC_2 0.5 40 750 0 1  10 000 5.4 2.8 2 
MAJC_3 0.35 21 548 1.8 2 5 0 7.2 2.4 2 
MAJC_4 0.32 27 900 2 4  2 400 1 2.6 1 
MAJC_5 0.32 27 350 1.29 5  5 250 4.2 2 1 
MAJC_6 0 46 000 0 1  10 000 11.2 0.8 2 
Average 0.25 34 724.67 0.83 2.33   5 941.67 6.00 2.33 1.33 
          
MAJnoC_1 0.25 38 930 0.6 0  10 000 6.8 0.6 1 
MAJnoC_2 0.54 19 800 2 2 5 0 5.4 1.2 3 
MAJnoC_3 0.42 21 050 0.5 3 7 0 3 2.6 3 
MAJnoC_4 0.42 12 972.5 1 3  2 537.5 3 3.4 4 
MAJnoC_5 0.33 19 050 1 3 7 0 5..2 3 2 
MAJnoC_6 0.25 17 265 2 3 4 0 6.6 1 3 
Average 0.37 21 511.25 1.06 2.33   2 089.58 4.96 1.97 2.67 
          
FIX25C_1 0.25 34 650 1.29   10 000 9.4 2 0 
FIX25C_2 0.25 44 250 0   10 000 2 2.8 1 
FIX25C_3 0.25 40 030 2.43   6 000 7.4 1 2 
FIX25C_4 0.25 43 250 0.14   10 000 7.6 2 0 
FIX25C_5 0.25 42 650 0.29   10 000 10.4 0.2 3 
FIX25C_6 0.25 42 150 0.29   10 000 7 3.2 0 
FIX25C_7 0.25 40 090 0.71   7 900 7.6 0 1 
FIX25C_8 0.25 43 250 0   10 000 1 2.4 2 
Average 0.25 41 903.33 0.64     8 983.33 6.83 1.47 1.33 
          
FIX25noC_1 0.25 18 150 1.43   1 250 3 2 2 
FIX25noC_2 0.25 34 025 0.5   8 125 5 1.8 4 
FIX25noC_3 0.25 26 625 1.83   3 375 5 0.4 4 
FIX25noC_4 0.25 30 400 2.83   4 500 9 3.8 0 
FIX25noC_5 0.25 28 931 1.5   3 230 3 3.2 0 
FIX25noC_6 0.25 38 275 0.75   7 625 3 0.8 4 
Average 0.25 31 057.75 1.52     4 682.5 5 2.05 2 
          
FIX10C_1 0.1 40 550 0.86   9 000 8.8 1.6 2 
FIX10C_2 0.1 32 830 1.57  7 0 4 0.2 1 
FIX10C_3 0.1 30 500 1.17  6 0 8.8 2 0 
FIX10C_4 0.1 40 640 0.43   4 000 9 0.4 3 
FIX10C_5 0.1 42 460 0.57   10 000 10.2 0.6 3 
FIX10C_6 0.1 45 200 0.14   10 000 9 2 0 
Average 0.10 38 696.67 0.78     5 500 8.3 1.13 1.5 
* Calculated only from those rounds in which a binding quota was passed. 
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5.3 Economic performance 
MAJC teams achieved net payoffs ranging from $ 21 548 to the maximum possi-
ble yield of $ 46 000, with an average of $ 34 725. MAJnoC teams performed worse 
on average ($ 21 511), with payoffs ranging between $ 12 973 and $ 38 930. Three 
MAJC and five MAJnoC teams ended up with a group payoff that was below the one 
they could have expected when setting rule 4 ($ 37 250). Prediction 2 is clearly re-
jected for both MAJC and MAJnoC teams (binomial test for a probability of reaching 
this minimum payoff of 0.95,    = 0.05). FIX25C teams reached payoffs between 
$ 34 650 and $ 44 250 and performed best on average ($ 41 290), while FIX25noC 
and FIX10C teams received group payoffs in the medium range ($ 31 057, respec-
tively $ 38 697). The net payoff of FIX25C teams is significantly larger than for MAJC 
teams (t-test,   = 0.1), for MAJnoC (Mann-Whitney-U-Test,   = 0.01), and for 
FIX25noC teams (t-test, 

 = 0.01) Prediction 6 is clearly supported. In addition, 
MAJC performed significantly better than MAJnoC teams (t-test,    = 0.05). Finally, 
FIX10C teams reached higher group payoffs than MAJnoC teams (t-test,   = 0.01) 
and FIX25noC teams (t-test, 

 = 0.05). To facilitate a direct comparison of commu-
nication versus institutional change as measures to escape the tragedy of the com-
mons, a two-way ANOVA using FIX25 and MAJ teams is performed. It shows a sig-
nificantly positive impact of communication on group payoff (F-Test, 

 = 0.01). At the 
same time, FIX25 teams are found to have reached a significantly higher group pay-
off than MAJ teams (F-Test,   = 0.01). Prediction 9, suggesting that MAJ teams will 
be economically more successful than FIX teams, is clearly rejected.  
Apart from the group payoff, the ability to preserve the CPR from extinction can 
be taken as an alternative measure of economic success. Except for one MAJC, four 
MAJnoC, and two FIX10C teams, all teams managed to keep the pool of fish from 
extinction. The average pension for these groups remained below $ 6 000. On the 
other hand, six out of eight FIX25C teams reached the full pension. The pensions of 
MAJC and FIX10C teams are significantly smaller than those of FIX25C teams 
(Mann-Whitney-U-Test,    = 0.1). The same is true for the pensions of the MAJnoC 
teams (Mann-Whitney-U-Test,   = 0.05) and FIX25noC teams (t-test,   = 0.01). At 
the same time, no difference was found between MAJC and MAJnoC teams on the 
one and FIX10C or FIX25noC teams on the other hand (t-test,    = 0.1). Prediction 4, 
according to which FIX teams cannot preserve the CPR from extinction, is clearly 
rejected (binomial test for a probability of extinction of 0.95, 

= 0.05). The two-way 
ANOVA using FIX25 and MAJ teams shows that FIX25 teams achieved significantly 
higher pensions (F-Test,   = 0.05). Communication is found to have a significantly 
positive effect on pensions as well (F-Test, 

 = 0.01).  
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5.4 Group characteristics and group performance 
Like previous experiments (e.g., Weimann 1994, Boone et al. 1999), this experi-
ment produces heterogeneous results with respect to group payoff, pensions, fre-
quency of defection or rule setting behavior. This section addresses the question of 
whether these differences result from differences in group characteristics. For this 
purpose, the sex composition of groups and average number of semesters was 
documented (see table 5). In most cases, the players within one team knew each 
other by name, yet the intensity of personal contact between them, measured by the 
average number of co-players who have visited each player before the game, dif-
fered substantially across teams. An average number of four visits means that each 
player has visited all of his co-players while zero visits indicates no private visiting at 
all. In a first step, it is necessary to compare the average team characteristics across 
set-ups to make sure that the differences in performance, in particular between MAJ 
and FIX25 teams, do not result from systematic differences in the teams between the 
two set-ups. With respect to the five different set-ups, no significant differences in the 
average number of semesters, number of female players, or intensity of pre-game 
contact among teams were observed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test,    = 0.05).
8
  
In a next step, the different performance of the individual teams is analysed to 
find a possible impact of group characteristics. The differences in group payoff, pen-
sion, and frequency of defection show no systematic relationship to the differences in 
the ascertained group characteristics. All corresponding Spearman’s coefficients of 
correlation are smaller than 0.42 (conservative testing,  = 0.05). Thus, there is no 
straight-forward monotonic relationship between group characteristics and perform-
ance. Given this first result, the influence of pre-game contact deserves a more thor-
ough analysis because groups of players who know each other well communicate 
more fruitfully and thus may be able to induce a higher level of cooperation. In Table 
6, the teams are divided into three categories with increasing intensity of pre-game 
contact. The table shows no monotonic relationship between the intensity of pre-
game personal contact and economic performance. Teams that had the second-most 
intensive pre-game contact (between 1 and 3 visits) performed worst in most groups. 
However, in a two-way ANOVA with respect to set-up and pre-game contact, the dif-
ferences in group pension, net group payoff, and rate of defection to the teams with 
lower respectively higher pre-game contact did not prove significant (t-test,   = 0.1). 
At the same time, there is a significant difference in patrolling intensity among MAJ 
teams with respect to intensity of pre-game contact. Those teams with a medium in-
tensity of contact set a significantly higher patrolling intensity than the other teams 
(Student-Newman-Keuls,    = 0.05).  
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Table 6: Intensity of pre-game contact and group performance 
Average number of 
visits 
n average 
patrolling 
intensity*
net group 
payoff 
defections 
per round 
changes 
in rule 
group 
pension 
average 
number of 
semesters
MAJC teams 
up to  1 visit 1 0 46 000 0 1 10 000 11.20 
between 1 and 3 visits 4 0.37 29 387 1.27 3 4 412.5 4.45 
3 or more visits 1 0 44 800 0.14 1 8 000 7 
                
MAJnoC teams 
up to  1 visit 2 0.25 28 097.50 1.3 1.5 5 000 6.7 
between 1 and 3 visits 2 0.48 20 425 1.25 2.5 0 4.2 
3 or more visits 2 0.38 16 011.25 1 3 1 268.75 3 
                
FIX25C teams 
up to 1 visit 3   40 923.33 1.14   7 966.67 8.47 
between 1 and 3 visits 4   41 350 0.36   10 000 5 
3 or more visits 1   42 150 0.29   10 000 7 
                
FIX25noC teams 
up to 1 visit 2   32 450 1.29   5 500 4 
between 1 and 3 visits 2   26 087.5 0.97   4 687.5 4 
3 or more visits 2   29 665.5 2.17   3 865 6 
        
FIX10C teams 
up to 1 visit 3   38 643.33 0.86   4 666.67 7.73 
between 1 and 3 visits 3   38 750 0.72   6 333.33 8.87 
3 or more visits               
All teams 
up to 1 visit 11 0.13 37 222.83 0.92 1.25 6 626.67 7.62 
between 1 and 3 visits 15 0.43 31 199.9 0.91 2.75 5 086.67 5.3 
3 or more visits 6 0.19 33 156.69 0.90 2 5 783.44 5.75 
* Calculated only from those rounds in which a binding quota was passed. 
6. Discussion  
All groups, regardless of whether they were allowed to change the institutional 
settings or not, witnessed a degree of cooperation throughout the entire game that 
substantially exceeded the one predicted by game theory. In those cases where de-
fection occurred, the players in more than 50 percent of the cases extracted less than 
the maximum possible 2 000 fish suggesting that the corresponding players wanted 
to defect without heavily diminishing the CPR in the case of success. This seemingly 
irrational behavior supports the notion put forth by Albers et al. (2000), who argue 
that the mere existence of chance constitutes a source of positive utility that is inde-
pendent of the structure of payoffs. At the same time, warm-glow effects are likely to 
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have prevented excessive defection (e.g. Andreoni, 1995, Palfrey and Prisbrey 
1997).  
With respect to the central question of the paper, the results provide strong evi-
dence for the importance of communication to resolve social dilemma situations. This 
support is threefold. First, communication made it possible for the teams to reach 
binding quotas that found strong support among most or all group members. Those 
teams who were not allowed to communicate were unable to reach this level of con-
sensus. The high degree of cooperation among FIX25C and FIX10C teams provides 
the second piece of evidence. Third and most important, the clear gap in both group 
payoff and pensions as well as in the average rate of defection between FIX25C and 
FIX25noC shows that communication is an efficient instrument to induce cooperation. 
At the same time, the performance of FIX10C teams shows that communication 
when combined with merely symbolic patrolling is not sufficient to ensure efficient 
results. The MAJnoC teams who were not allowed to communicate tried to compen-
sate for this by increasing the patrolling intensity, thereby keeping the rate of defec-
tion at a lower level. However, they did not fully compensate for the lack of communi-
cation.  
As in previous double-choice experiments, the MAJ groups made frequent use of 
the right to change the institutional settings. In the current experiment, all teams 
made use of this possibility at least once during the experiment. This gives further 
support to the notion that individuals regard institutional change as a method of dis-
solving social dilemma situations. In one central aspect, however, the results of the 
current experiment heavily contradict those of previous double-choice experiments. 
Unlike the teams in the experiments performed by Sato (1987) and Carpenter (2000), 
the MAJ teams in the current experiment were not able to capitalize the right to 
change the institutional settings. When compared to the FIX25 teams, who started 
with the same patrolling intensity without being allowed to change them, they were 
even significantly less successful economically. This result heavily contradicts the 
wisdom of textbooks on the economic theory of decision making that state that an 
additional option never reduces the payoff of an economic agent and at worst leaves 
the payoff unchanged. Neither a lack in self-control (e.g., Thaler 1991, p.77-90) nor 
problems of self-commitment (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, p.74-77) can explain 
why the additional option led to losses in average payoffs.  
7.  Conclusion  
Messick and Brewer have named two different measures, communication and in-
stitutional change, by which groups of people can resolve social dilemma situations 
and reach efficient results. One strand of literature reports on a number of laboratory 
experiments that show that communication improves efficiency. Another strand 
shows that groups make use of the right to change the rules in order to overcome the 
social dilemma. So far, however, there is no experimental study that directly com-
pares the two measures in a unified set-up. This paper reports on a series of labora-
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tory experiments which facilitate this comparison. As in most experiments on social 
dilemma situations, the degree of voluntary cooperation was substantially higher than 
predicted by game theory. With respect to the impact of communication, the results 
are in line with previous studies, showing that those groups who are allowed to com-
municate reach higher payoffs than those groups who are not given this opportunity. 
At the same time, the MAJ groups who were given the right to set efficient institutions 
were not able to capitalize the right but performed worse than the FIX25 teams who 
played under a set of fixed institutions that, according to game theoretic reasoning, 
were too weak to induce cooperation. This result contradicts elementary economic 
reasoning and casts doubt on the ability of individuals to predict correctly the impact 
of institutional change and thus their capability to apply institutional change to resolve 
social dilemma situations.  
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Appendix: Backward induction to support Prediction 5 
Assume that the group agreed to install rule 1. In this case, a defecting player can earn 
$ 2 000 instead of $ 1 000 by defecting. If, in the next round, a higher patrolling rule is set, 
his future income is reduced by the additional patrolling costs. These are higher, the more 
rounds are left. In addition, the increased patrolling intensity will make it less profitable for 
him to defect in the next rounds. If he complies to the quota, he can earn only $ 600 instead 
of $ 1 000 in the round following his defection. After that, a gross fishing income of $ 1 000 is 
feasible again. Hence his net gain from defection in round t is given by the following formula: 
 Net gain = 600 –  CR x (7 - (t+1)) (2) 
where CR represents the change in patrolling costs per round. 
For any player who expects one or more of his co-players to defect, 
 
CR = 0 because 
the patrolling intensity will be increased regardless of his own action. Thus he faces massive 
incentives to defect. Now consider the case where the individual player expects all his co-
players to comply to the quota. Assuming rule 3 (C = $ 150) is set as a reaction to defection, 
defecting pays if there are less than 4 rounds left to play. If, however, players realize that 
under rule 1, defection is rational in rounds 4-6, they must introduce a higher patrolling rule in 
the beginning of round 4 to fight defection effectively. As a result, the net gain from defecting 
in round 3 equals $ 600, as  CR = 0. Hence control has to be introduced in round 3. If this is 
again anticipated, a player can try to increase his income by defecting in round 2. In the end, 
this line of reasoning leads to the following prediction 5. 
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